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ABSTRACT 
This paper characterizes necessary and sufficient conditions 
for heterogeneous search goods to trade at their competitive prices, 
and derives policy implications from these conditions. The model 
differs from earlier search equilibrium models in that it assumes 
the existence of product heterogeniety. 
Our principle conclusions are that markets for heterogeneous 
search goods tend rather easily to segment into homogeneous subsets; 
when they do not, heterogeniety can work against the existence of 
competitive equilibria because it dilutes the effectiveness of search. 
Nevertheless, the likelihood of competitive equilibria obtaining in 
heterogeneous search goods markets can often be increased by reducing 
the costs to consumers of directly comparing purchase alternatives. 
COl!PETITIVE EQUILIBRIA IN llARKETS For. l!ETEROGENEOUS GOODS UNDEr. 
IMPERFECT INFORMATION: A 1111!.0P.ETICAL ANALYSIS WITII POLICY Ull'LICATIO!lS 
Alan Sch·a rt:r.• a nd Lou is L. W ilde•• 
1. Introduction 
For over a de cade , the Fede ral Gove rnment has re sponded 
aggre11 ively to apparent i nformat ion impe rfec t i ons in consumer 
marte t a .  Example • of auch reapon se s i n clude the Trut h  in Lending Law ,  
the Magnuuon-Mo s s  W arranty-Fede ral Trade Commission Improv ement Ac t ,  
the Con aWDer Le a s i ng Act a nd t h e  Real E s t a t e  Se t tlement Proce dures 
Act . Cong r e s s  h a s  pa s s e d  almo s t  all of thi s re gula t ion , howevc:r , w i th 
no cle a r  i de a  of what purpos e s  i t  wanted t o  ach i eve, or could in fact 
a ch ieve,  or of the rela t ion be tween various i n t e rvent ion strat e g i c s  
a n d  t h e  pos s ible goala o f  gove rnment a c t ion, In prev ious papers, 1 wu
have a r gued that the ata te should be princ ipally conce rned w i th 
compe t i t i ve equilibr i a; that is,  au inte rvent ion ba sed ou information 
1round1 ia j us t i f i e d  i f  and only if the coat s to consll.l:le rs of be com ing
i nformed about purchase  cho i ces are 10 h i g h  that noncompe t i t i ve 
equilibr i a  exi s t ,  aud intervent i ons conse que ntly should be d i rec tetl to 
incre a s ing the l ikeli hood that  co�pe t i t ive equ il ibr i a  w ill ob t a i n. 
The formal model suppo r t i n g  t hese prelim inary conclus ions 
[Wilde a nd Schw a r t:r. ,  1 97 9] made f a i rly s t rong a ssump t i ons . In 
pa r t i cula r, it modeled marke t s  for homoge neous search good s-- ident i cal 
produc t s  all of whose fea tures consumers could observe before 
purchase . Thus it had d i r e c t  applicability only to markets such as 
those for money or whea t .  The model ' s  rela t ive s impl ic i ty 
never theless enabled us to derive  int ui t ively plaua ible cr i te r i a  for 
r e cogni:r.ing when a marke t is likely to be be hav ing ba dly be cause  of 
2 i nforma t ion problems ,  and t o  devc:lop s t r a te g i e s  that dcci1iolll!lake r 1
could u s e  t o  move marke t •  toward compe t i t ive equ i l ibr i a . The se 
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s t r a te,ies followed from the v i ew that  the likelihood of a compe t i t i v e  
equilibriwn ob t a i n ing v a r i ed d i rec tly w i th t h e  extent of co�pa r i so& 
shopp ing p r e s e n t  in a marke t ;  they thua cons i a t e d  m a inly of methods of 
reduc ing the cos t a  to con sumer• of d i rec tly compa ring  purcha se 
alt erna t ives.  Th is pape r bei;ins to explore whe ther the conclus ions 
that followed f roru our or iainal model are appl icable in mor e cocplex 
e nv i roruncnt a .  
ConaUJt e r s  i n  the model developed below shop pur suant to  a 
f ixed sample s i:r.e a t r a tcgy in a marke t  that pot e nt i ally suppli es o. 
search good a t  two qual i t i es, "low" and "hi g h".3 Although the se
cons111ncr s have preference s for low or high  qual i ty goods, they have 
impre c ise i nforma t ion, when t hey be g in to  search , as to  where e i ther 
good can be found or what prices they are  l ikely to fac e .  Thus 
consU1Dcrs shop rando�ly acros s qual i ty levels. The f i rms in thi s 
model pursue r ela t ively pa s s ive  s t r a te g i e s , in that  they do not 
adver t i se but instead  only charge pa r t i cula r price s and change the se 
pr i ces when changes would increa se expe c t e d  prof i t s .  U e  d e r i ve 
ne cessary and s uff i c i ent  cond i t ion s for an equilibrium to obt a i n  i n  
w h i c h  bo th t h e  low and t h e  h i gh qual i ty goods t rade a t  th� i r  
compe t i t i ve p r i c e s .  
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Surpr i 1 i naly , i t  turns out t h a t  our or i g i nal homoge neous 
search goods model haa con s i de rable g e neral i ty . Thi s i1 because  i t  
take s f a i rly s t rong 1s 1umpt ion1 t o  p revent the marke t s  for high a nd 
low qual i ty goods from ' ' se gme nt ing'' .  For example , the two markets 
w ill s e gment nnle s s  consume r s  who prefer low qua l i ty goods will buy 
high qual i ty goods that t r a de a t  the i r  compe t i t ive  price  if the 
consume r s' search reveals only h i gh qual i ty goo d s ; if these conslll:lcrs 
would not pur c h a s e  h i gh qual i ty goods  in t h i s  c i rcum s t a nce , they 
a c t ually are shoppe r s  only for lo"· quali ty .  S im ilarly , the two 
marke t s  w ill s e gment unle s s  consUl:le r s  who prefe r h i gh qual i ty goods 
will buy low qual i ty goods that  trade a t  the i r  compe t i tive p r i ce if  
the  consume r s  s e a r ch reve1l1 only low qual i ty goods ;  if these 
consume r s  would not purcha se low quality goods in t h i s  c i rcumstance , 
they a c t ually are shoppe rs only for h i gh qual i ty .  If the se two 
condi t ion s fa il, low and h i gh qual i ty goods w ill t rade in d i s t inct  
marke t s  • .  To see more v iv idly the r e s t rict ivene s s  of the se condi tions , 
con s i de r the marke t for compact cnra, Unle s s  the consumers who shop 
in i t  and w ho prefer BtM s or Mercede s e s  are w ill int to pur chase 
Torot a s  or Da t sun s that  t rade a t  the i r  compe t i tive price s if the 
con sumer s' sea rch fa ils to  rev eal a high quality deale r ,  the co"-pa ct  
car  mark.e t will se gment . It will also segr1cnt unless the consllr.lcrs 
who shop in it aud who prefer Toyotas or Da t suns are will in& to 
purchase m111s or Me rcedeses t rading a t  compe ti tive pri ces if the 
consumers' search fails to reveal a low quality tlealer. The st reng th 
of the s e  condi tions, in many marke t s, imp! ies t hat segmentation is 
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oft e n  l ikely for search good s .  Thus , 1 model that pre suppo se s product 
homogene i ty has applicab i l i ty to a f a i rly w ide range of ca se s ,  
O n  t h e  other hand, when t he marke t s  for low a n d  h i gh qual i ty 
aootl s do inte r a c t ,  product hete roge ne i ty c a n  work a ga i n s t  the 
e x i s t e nce of  compe titive e quilib r i a ,  some t ime s do ins so in 
non intu i t i ve way s .  Th i s  i s  because hete roae ne i ty dilu t e s the 
effectivene s s  of s e a r c h .  A1 our earlier work h a s  shown, pr ice s are 
dr iven down to  compe t i t ive levels in search equil ibr iua. models a 1  a 
re sult of compe t i t ion amona f i rm s  for shoppe r s .  Suppos e ,  howev e r ,  
that some consume r s  w ho shop t w i c e  v i s i t  one h i gh and o n e  low qual i ty 
f i rm .  The se con sume r s  effec t ively are non1hoppe r 1  in bot h  marke t s, 
In con se que nce , if a s  much shopping occu r s  in a heterog e neous 11 in a 
homogeneous goods marke t ,  f irm s  in the former marke t m ay face fewer 
a c t ual compa r i son shoppe r s  and t hus  be more l ikely to f ind i t  
profitable t o  dev i a t e  from the compe t i t ive pr ice , Fur ther , because  of 
the pos s ibil i ty that  shopper¥ who prefer one qual i ty w ill ''spill 
over''  into the marke t for the other quality--!·�· v i s i t  one or more 
f irms tha t sell the le s s  pre ferred qual i ty--increa s i ng the number of 
shoppe r s  i n  a g iven marke t co�ld some t ime s cause that oarke t to behave 
le s s  compe t i t iv ely than before the increa se . 
Se c t i on 2 se t s  out the formal model and de r i v e s cond i tions for 
when the marke t s  for low anti high quality gootls will i n t e r ac t ,  
Sections 3 ,  4 and 5 d e r i ve neces sary and suffic i e nt con d i t ions for
when competitive equil ibria will obtain in both marke t s  a nd explain 
the intui tion unde rlyinc these condi tions . Se c t ion 6 then briefly 
s 
d i 1cu1 1e 1 the pol i cy illpl icat iona and l im i ta t ions of the analy s i s ,  In 
par t icular , we argue that while the opportun i t i e s  of f i rms to make 
prof i table dev iat ions f rom the compe t i t ive  pr i ce o f t e n  can be 
UJ11mb i 1uou1ly reduce d  be cause  of the hiah probab i l i ty of s e gmenta t i on, 
when the marke t s  for d i f ferent qual i t i e s  do in  fac t inte ract know ing 
when a marke t is be havinG badly and whether a par t i cular intervent ion 
w ill help become d i f f icul t  que s t i on s ,  
2 . A Search Equilibrium Model with lletorouneous Goods 
In t h i s  1 e c t i on, we develop a model for a hete rog e neous search 
good--one that i s  de s c r ibed by pr ice  and ''qua l i ty'' but all of whose 
feature s are ob s e rvable be fore purchase . Th i s  good is supplied a t  two 
d i s t inct qual i ty levels , ''low'' and ''hi gh'' • The adj e c t ive s low and 
h i gh ac t ually are convent i on s ;  the formal model requ i r e s  only t hat the 
two goods be d i f ferent iated membe r •  of  the 11me ( narrowly de f ine d )  
produ c t  cle 1 1 ,  
The technology a11oc i1ted w i th producing  t he low qual i ty aood 
i s  de s c r ibe d by a f ixed c o s t , FL' a cons tant marg i nal coat , cL' and a 
capa c i ty constraint on f i rm she , 'L' Sim ilarly , the technology
associated w i th p roduc ing the h i gh qual i ty good i s  descr ibe d  by a 
f iled c o s t ,  F11, a con1tant mar g i nal c o s t ,  c11 , and a capac i ty 
cons t raint on f i rm she , 'II' The capa c i ty const raint i s  an 
analy t i cally conveni ent sub s t i tute for the usual as sumpt ion o f  U 
shaped average co s t  curve s ,  
c0 + (F11/s11) thus become the ''compe t i t ive'' pr ice s assoc iated with
t he two qual i ty levels , The only 111111Dp t ion we make re11rd i n1 the 
r elat ionship be tween t he two te chnolog i e s  1 1  t ha t  the c ompet i t iv e  
p r i c e s d i f fer; t o  pre serve con 1 i 1tency w i t h  our earlier terminology , 
• • 
we suppose that PL < p11 • F irms o f f er e i ther the low qual Hy good or
t he h i gh quali ty good but not bo t h ,  The total numbe r o f  f i rm s  i s  U, 
w i th NL f irms tell ing low qual i ty aoo d s  and Nu f irms s ell ing h i g h
qual i ty goo d s . W e  d e  f i ne � • Nz_IN and Du • NiJIN. F i rm s  a h o  d o  no t 
adver t i se , Instea d ,  t hey char ge a pr i c e ,  wai t  to see who buy s and 
�lte r  pr i ce s when t hi s would increa se expe c t e d  p r of i t s .  
Each c on sumer i n  t he mar ke t  l iv e 1  for one per i od, demand• one 
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un i t  of t he low qual i ty good or one un i t  of the h i gh qual i ty good (but 
not bot h) , and e i ther purcha s e s  or  ge t s  a rai ncbeck at the end of  the 
per i od if he or she f i nds a f i rm whose price i1 acceptable . Consumer s 
ar e par t i t i oned i n  two d i s t inct  way s ,  according to tbo1 e who 1bop and 
t hose who do not •hop and accord ing to t hos e who ''pre f er'' low 
qual i ty and t hose who ''pre f er'' high qual i ty .  The nat ure of thi s 
pre ference for quali ty w ill be made clear below , For now,  let A1 be
t he numbe r of nonshopper s and A2 be the nlllDbe r of shopper 1; t he total
number of con1umer s h t he n  A • A1 + Az, where Al > 0 and Az > 0,
Al so, le t L A1 be the number of nonshopper 1 who pre fer low qua 1 i ty and
L A2 be the number of shopper s who pre fer low qual i ty .  U s i ng a s imilar 
notat ion for hi gh qual i ty ,  we have AL• A� + � and AH= A� + �1• 
All con sumer s act ually search pur suant to a f i xe d  sample si ze 
s t rategy ,  in accordance w i th w hi ch each con sumer crea t e s and exhaus t s  
a pre set sample o f  f i rm s  be fore he o r  she be g i ns t o  s h op. 4 F o r  some 
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con1W11ors--tho ''non1hoppor1''--tho sample 1izo is one; for the 
othor1--the ''1hopper1''--the sample 1ize i1 n. For the remainder of 
this paper we restrict n to two for expositional convenience. The 
1hopper• thus sample precisely two firms at random across both guglity 
lt.!J.l.l before purchasing, This shopping pattern is one of a set of 
sufficient conditions that allows the market• for the two quality 
typos to interact, An alternative shopping pattern that would also 
allow the markets for the two typo• of goods to interact would arise 
if consWDers were aware of the quality each firm offered but not its 
price; would buy either type of aood if offered the opportunity to do 
10 at its competitive price; and chose deliberately to shop across 
quality levels to compare price-quality tradeoffs, We rule out a 
''cro11-qu1lity'' shopping pattern in this paper for two reasons. 
First, it ii to some extent inconsistent with the model's forcial 
assumption that consumer• learn about prices and qualities only by 
direct nmpl ins of firms. Second, the random shopping strategy has 
fairly broad application because low and high quality refer, as said 
above, only to differentiated members of the same (narrowly defined) 
product clan, 
A crucial aspect of modeling consumer behavior in 1 world of 
heterogeneous aoods, as this discussion suggests, is to characterize 
consumer preferences acro11 quality classes. In this paper, we 
consider only competitive equilibria, and thus we need not specify 
consumer behavior over all possible combinations of prices for the two 
types of goods; rather we can hold one or the other price fixed at its 
competitive level and define preferences in terms of it, 
To begin, suppose that if offered the opportunity to buy the 
• • L aoods at their competitive prices, denoted (pL' p11
), members of A 
would buy the low qua l lty good and members of A11 would buy the high 
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quality good. Next let the price of the low quality aood remain fixed 
at p� but the price of the high quality aood rise. Members of AL
would still want the low quality good, but members of A11 at some point 
would switch from buy ins high to buying 1 ow quality, Let Pu 
be the
price for the high quality aood at which these latter consumers are 
just indifferent to switching; in other words, suppose there to exist 
• 
a price P
u 
> Pu such that, if offered the opportunity to buy the aoods 
at prices (p�·Pu>, members of A11 will buy high quality if Pu .S. Pu and
will buy low quality if Pu > Pu• Similarly, suppose there to exist a 
• 
price PL > pL such that, if offered the opportunity to buy the goods 
at prices (pL,p;), members of A
L 
will buy low quality if pL .S. pL and
will buy high quality if PL ) PL' 
Consumers also have ''limit prices'' for both quality levels, 
If no high quality goods were available, IL is the �aximum price that 
a consumer who prefers low quality would pay for the low quality good 
and hL is the maximum price that a consumer who prefers high quality 
would pay for the low quality good, Similarly, if no low quality 
goods were available, 111 is the maximum price that a eonsu.cior who
prefers low quality would pay for the high quulity good and J;1 is the 
maximum price that a consumer who prefers high quality would pay for 
the high quality good, Three comments need to be made regarding these 
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limit prices, First, although each consumer in reality would have an 
individual limit price, we suppose all members of A
L 
and all members
of All to have common respective limit prices. This anumption is 
analytically convenient and does not affect the model's qualitativ� 
conclusions. Second, limit prices for the low quality good are 
independent of conditions in the market for the high quality good, and 
limit prices for the high quality good are independent of conditions 
in the market for the low quality good. These 111umption1 reflect the 
premise that consumer• begin shopping with very imprecise information 
regarding the two markets, 
The third important point respecting these limit prices is 
that since consumers are a11umed to buy only one unit of the good, the 
difference between the limit price for a quality type and the purchase 
price of that quality type measures consumer surplus, This enables 
our a11umption1 concerning consumers' tastes for quality to be 
translated into constraints on the relationship between limit prices 
• 
and competitive prices, We have already 11111t1ed that PL > PL and 
• 
Pu> Pu· It is also realistic to require that PL i lL and Pu i hu· 
That is, tho price at which consumers who prefer low quality will 
switch from low quality to high quality (given that high quality can 
be purchased at it• competitive price) is le11 than or equal to the 
maximum price consumers would pay for low quality rather than so 
without the good altogether: and the price at which consumers who 
prefer high quality will switch from high quality to low quality 
(given that low quality can be purchased at its competitive price) is 
io 
less than or equal to the maximum price they would pay for hiah 
quality rather than 10 without the 1ood alto1ether, These assumptions 
yield two constraints on PL and p11: 
( 1) 
(2) 
The ''switch price'' for consumers who prefer low quality baa 
been defined 11 that price at which the consumer is indifferent 
between buying the low quality good and switching to the high quality 
good, 111uming it c1n be purchased at it• competitive price, In terms 
- . of consumer surplus, thi1 means that lL-pL• le-Iii' Rearranging tbi•
expression gives ID analytical definition of pL: 
An analogous argument provides an analytical definition of Pu: 
Substituting ( 3 )  and ( 4 )  into (1) and (2) yields: 
• • 
Pu ( hu-11, + pt i hu,
• The right band inequalities in (S) and (6) reduce to p11 i 18 and
• 
PL i �· If these inequalities are not satisfied, the markets will
( 3 )  
( 4 )  
(S) 
( 6 )  
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necessarily 1e1ment--con1umer1 who prefer low quality would never buy 
hiah quality and consumers who prefer high quality would never buy low 
quality. S 
The left hand inequalities in (S) and (6) can be summarized as 
The terms lll - lL and bu - hL are interpreted as the marginal 
willingness to pay for high quality by consumers who prefer low 
quality and consumers who prefer high quality, respectively. This 
premium must be le11 than the marginal cost of high quality in 
competitiye equilibrium for consumers who prefer low quality and 
greater than the marginal cost of high quality in competitive 
equilibrium for consumers who prefer high quality, in order for the 
two markets to interact, Because there is no compelling reason for 
equation (7) to be satisfied in most cases, this constraint also 
suggests that segmentation is likely to occur, 
Finally, in this model, equilibrium is defined b)' a total 
consumer firm ratio, A/N, a distribution of firms across the two 
(7) 
quality levels, (nL' nll)' and a distribution of prices for each 
quality level such that (a) all consumers pursue specified shopping 
strategies, (b) given the equilibrium distribution of firms across the 
two quality levels all firms earn zero expected profits, and (c) no 
firm can earn positive prof its by changing its price offer or its 
quality level. 
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3. Neco111ry apd Sufficient Conditions for a Co;petitiye Equilibrium I: 
Dalancin& Con1tr1int1 
Under full information, the cl111ic1l competitive equilibrium 
would satisfy the equilibrium conditions just specified. There would 
be A
L
/sL firms producina the low quality good, each charging p� . and
A1
1
/ 111 f 1 
• 
Tb irms producing the high qua ity good, each charging Pu• e
assumptions of this model, however, preclude such an outcome. Because 
of ' 11pillover1' ' between the markets, our model at best permits a 
' ' pseudo-competitive' ' equilibrium in which all firms earn zero 
• 
profits and those which sell the low quality good do so at pL and 
• those which sell the blah quality good do 10 at Pu• The difference
between this pseudo-competitive equilibrium and the cla11ical 
competitive equilibrium is that in the former NL need not equal A
L
/,L
II and N11 need not equal A l•u· This paper thus uses the phrase
' ' competitive equilibrium' ' actually to describe a pseudo-competitive 
equilibrium, 6 
In our earlier homoaeneous search goods model, the number of 
firms extant in competitive equilibrium was given simply by the ratio 
of total con1umer1 to firm capacity. Hence the necessary and 
sufficient condition for a competitive equilibriwn in that model was 
derived by asking whether deviating from the competitive price would 
be an unprofitable strategy for any firm. In the present heterogenous 
search goods model, an additional set of constraints is needed in 
order to maintain equality between expected demand and capacity in 
each market, We first derive these new ' 'balancing constraints' ' in 
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Section 3 ,  The ''breaking constraints,'' which imply that deviating 
from the competitive price would be an unprofitable strategy for 
either low or hiah quality firms, are derived in Section 4 ,
When A�+� > 0 ,  the only possible degenerate equilibrium is 
at (p�, p�).7 To derive necessary and sufficient conditions for this 
pair to be au equilibrium, we initially take NL and Nu as given, and 
• 
assume that all firms selling the low quality good charge PL nnd all 
• 
firms selling the hiah quality aood charge pll' We then calculate 
expected demand for each type of firm, which we set equal to capacity 
in each market to allow us to solve directly for NL and tlH'
To begin, all firms get an equal share of the nonshoppers, 
A1/N, but do not get an equal share of the shoppers even though there 
ii no price diapers ion within quality levels. Uerabers of A� who 
sample two firms offering the high quality good will buy frou; one of 
them at random. Those who sample one firm offering the low quality 
good and one firm offering the high quality aood will buy the 12.! 
quality good. Those who sample two firms offering the low quality 
good will buy from one of them at random. 
similarly. 
ll Members of AZ behave 
To calculate expectei! demand for firms offering the low 
L 
quality good, fir1t suppose that a member of A2 samples a firm
offering the low quality good. The probnbil ity that this conslllllcr 
buys from the firm is equal to the probnbil i ty that his or her other 
observation is from a firm offering the low quality good times one-
half plus the probability thnt his or her other obscrvution is frorr. a 
1 4  
!lrm offering the high quelity good; .i·.!· ((NL/N) (1/2) + o�1/N)) ,8 
The probability that a member of � samples any given firm is 2/N
because shoppers sample precisely two firms, Uence the total expected 
demand from members of � is 
A�(2/N)[ (NL/N) (1/2) + (N11/N) J = (�/N)[ <tVN> + <2Ni1/N) J. II Next suppose that a member of ";: samples a f inu offering the
low quality good. The probability that this consumer buys fr"'1 the 
Cina is equal to the probability that bis or her other observation is 
also froc a fir� offerin& the low quality good times one-half. The 
probability that a member of �I samples any given firm is again 2/N,
Uence the total expected demand from members of � h 
In consequence, expected demand nt firms offering the low quality good 
is 
Sill:il ar ly, 
The next step in deriving necessary and sufficient conditions 
• • 
for a competitive distribution of firms over (pL' p11) to be an 
equilibriWll is to note that DL 'L' and D11 = s11 ore impl led by the
:r.ero profit constraint. This is because demund persistently greater 
than capacity implies that fir�s could profitably enter while dcncn� 
persistently leas than capacity implies that firms are earning 
negative profits or charging noncompetitive prices, From the 
definitions of DL and 011 and the zero profit constraint we thus get
the following necessary condition for a competitive equilibrium: 
These will determine NL and Nll' The details of this derivation are 
presented in the appendix. It turns out that 
Equations (8) and (9) imply that 
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(8) 
( 9) 
(10)  
We also require NL l 0 and H11 l 0 ,  Frooi (ll) and (9), these
constraints are equivalent to 
Condition (11) is not sufficient to guarantee that the 
competitive equilibriw:1 will occur. It does establish constraints 
(necessary conditions) , however, 011 the riix of shoppers aud 
( 11) 
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nonshoppers that must be associated with a proper balance of firms 
offering the low quality good and firms offering the high quality good 
for a co�petitive distribution of firms to be an equilibrium, 
These balancing constraints nevertheless are atrong and 
nonintuitive, For example, equation ( 10 )  shows that for a competitive 
equilibrium in .lu!1h markets to exist, the difference between the 
number of shoppers who prefer the low quality good and the number of 
shoppers who prefer the high quality good must have the same sign as 
the difference between the capacity constraint for firms offering the 
low quality good and the capacity constraint for firms offering the 
high qunl ity good, The explanation of this necesnry condition is 
that firms with large capacity need to attract more cons�ers in 
corupetitive equilibriun; than firms with small capacity. If capacity 
constraints are roughly similar--sL is not much greater than s11--but
A; is considerably larger than A�, a competitive equilibrium could 
still occur throu11h adjustments in the proportions of fil'llls: nL will 
increase and n
11 
will decline. These adjustments, however, could never
overco�c an absolute advantage in the opposite direction of the 
capacity constraints because each fim has an inherent advantage in 
attracting those shoppers who prefer its own quality level, Thus, if 
s
11 ) sL while � > A�i, firms which offer high quality gooc:is would
experience persistent excess capacity. 
4. Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for a Competitive Eauilibrium Iii 
Ureaking Constraints 
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Suppose that the constraint in equation (11) h satisfied; NL 
firms offer the low quality aood at 
• 
quail ty aood • t Pu (where NL and NII 
• 
pL; 
are 
and N
11 firms offer 
given by equations 
the high 
(8) and 
(9) ) ,  We wl1h to characterize conditions under which this situation 
is stable with respect to individual firms raising their prices. A 
firm that deviates from the competitive equilibrium bas several 
pricing options, with the profitability of each depending on the 
relatlon1hlp1 between switch price• and limit prices in the relevant 
market, We first consider firms offering the low quality good, 
!1..11..i.. Deyiafiona by Low Quality Firms 
• 
Suppose that all blah quality firms charge Pn and all low 
• 
quality firms except one charge pL' The deviant firm h11 three 
pricing options, to cbarae PL' IL or hL' The relative profitability 
of each option depends on the relationships between the three prices, 
If 111 other firms charge the competitive price, any firm 
selling the low quality good that raises its price to hL will lose 
only those shoppers who have sampled both it and another firm offering 
the low quality good, regardle1s of whether they prefer low quality or 
high quality. The firm retains all nonshoppers and those shoppers who 
prefer low quality and sample one firm offering the low quality good 
and one firm offering the high quality good. Expected profits become 
1 8 
• • 
The competitive distribution at (pL, pll) is an equilibriWD if expected 
profits from deviating (in thi1 ca1e charging bL) are nonpositlve; 
that is, if 
Re ca 11 th• t °I, • NL/N and n11 • Nii! N, 
Let 1 "' nL sL + °ti •u be
''average'' capacity under a competitive dl1trlbution. Then the 
constraint requi1ite for a competitive equilibrium is 
L L 
where a1 = A1/A and a2 • A:J.IA • 
( 12) 
No11· suppose the deviant firm raises its price to pL' In this 
case it loses, in addition to shoppers who have sampled another low 
quality firm, those nonshoppers who prefer high quality. Thi• i• 
because PL > hL. Expected profits become 
The associated constraint requisite for a competitive equilibriuc is 
(13) 
where •t = At/A. 
Finally, suppose that the deviant firm raises its price to IL, 
In this case, it loses all shoppers and those nonshopper1 who prefer 
1 9  . 
hiah qual i ty .  Thi s i s  because l L > hL' Expec ted prof i t •  become
The 11 1oc i1tetl constraint requiai te for 1 compe t i t ive equi l ib r ium i s  
( 14) 
A l ow qua l i ty f irm would have no incent ive to  depa r t  f rom the 
compe t i t ive p r i ce in  case Ll only i f  equ a t ions ( 12) , ( 13 )  a nd ( 14)  J.ll 
L L - L hol d ;  i n  equiv a l ent aummary notat ion, maxln 1 ( �) ,  n1<PL) '  n1<1L) )  i O. 
• Case 1..2: PL < PL < hL < IL 
The analy s i s  for thi s coae proceeds a s  in case Ll .  If a 
dev iant f irm charge s pL' it l o se s  only those shopper s who have sa1Jpled 
two l ow qual i ty f irms, Dence prof i t s  are 
and the ana l oi;ue to ( 13 )  is 
If  the f in charges hL' it l o ses a l l  shopper s s i nce hL > pL' Hence
prof i t s  are 
and the 1n1l oaue to ( 12) i s  
F i n a l ly, i f  i t  charges l L i t  aga i n  l oaes a l l  ahopper s and thou 
nonshopper s who prefer high qua l i ty .  Hence prof i ta are 
and ( 14)  rema i n s  Wlchanged: 
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( 16 )  
( 17 )  
The breaking constraint s for the l ow qua l i ty f irm in ca se L2 cons i s t
o f  equa t i ons ( 15 ,  ( 16 )  and ( 17 )  J.ll hol d in g ,  o r  in  equival ent 1111111111ry
L L - L no tat ion, maxln2( �) , n2( pL) ,n2(
1L) )  i 0 ,
Case L3: p� < PL < IL < hL 
The l os i c  here works prec i sely 11 i n  t he f i r s t  two ca ses . 
Prof i ta are 
and the ana l ogue s to  ( 12) ,  ( 13) , and ( 14)  are, respec t ivel y ,  
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II -al i FL/1 (11_-cL), ( 18) 
L - -al+ 212111 i FL/s (pLcL),
al i FL/; ( lL-cL) '
(19) 
(20) 
The breaking constraint• for the low quality firm in case L3 consist 
of equations ( 18 ) ,  ( 19) and (20) JJ..l holding, or in equivalent 1Ullllllary 
L L- L notation, max(n3(�), n3(pL), n3ClL)) i 0, 
4(b); Peyiationt by Biah Quality Firms 
• 
Suppose that all low quality firms charge pL and all high 
• 
quality firms except one charge pll
' The deviant firm has three
pricing options, analo,ous to the low quality deviant analy�ed in 
aection 4(a); it can charge Pu, 111 or hn- Again, three cases of
interest ar iae. These ca ae s and the a uoc iate d breaking constraints 
II -al + 
212 '\. i Fu/• (1u-c11) ,
n al +
n - -2a2'\. i Ful•<pu-cn>,
II -al i Fu/• ( 1iu-c11) •
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(21) 
(22) 
(23) 
Equation (21), (22) and (23) must J..1.1 hold, or equivalently, 
II 11 - II • maxln
2
< 111> , n1 (pll) ,n1 <fiu> I i 0 for the COl!lpetitive distribution at (pL'
• 
Pu> to be an equilibrium, 
follow. n�<hu> = (A�1/N) <l;ccll) - Fil'
The breakiug constraints are thus 
(24) 
(2S) 
(26) 
The breaking constraints are thus Equations (24), (2S) and (26) must .!.l.l hold, or equivalently, 
D D - H masln2(10),n2<p0),n2<J;1>J i 0 for the compe t i t ive d i s t r ibu t i on a t
• • (pL,pU) to be an equ i l ibr iwn,
The breaki�g c o n s t r a i n t s  are 
Equa t i on s  (27), (28) and (29) mus t .1.11 hol d ,  or equiv a lent ly, 
II U - II muln 3< 111> ,n3lp0) ,n31 hu)) i 0 for the compe t i t ive d i s t r ibu t i on a t
• • (pL,pl ) t o  be an equ i l  ibr iwu.
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(27) 
(28) 
(29) 
The con s t ra i nt s ref l ected in equa t i ons (15) through (29) ore
rou&hly ana l ogous to the s i ng l e  con s t raint derived in  W i l de and 
Schwartz (197 9) for the homogeneous search aoods ca se. Together w i th 
equat ion (11), these cons t raint s prov ide a set of nece s s a ry and 
suffic ient cond i t i ons for the competit ive d i s t r i bu t i on of f irms a t  
• • 
(pL,pll). def ined by (8) and (9), to be an equ i l ibrium; that h, they 
24 
prov ide a set of nece s sary and s u f f i c i ent cond i t ions for a compe t i t ive 
outcoce in  both marke t s .  
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5. An Apaly1i1 of tho Breakipa Cop1traint1; The Releyapce of Product 
Hetoroune ity 
To under stand the relevance of the constr aint s derived above, 
it i1 important to recognize that the marke t s  for low and high quality 
1ood1 interact in two distinct way s ,  First, a member of Ai can spill 
over ' ' completely ' '  into t he market for high quality goods if both of 
hi• or her ob1erv1tion1 a re taken a t  firms w hich offer only the high 
quill ty good, L Such 1 member of Ai i1 effec tively 1 comparison shopper
in the market for high quality 1ood1. A member of A!] similarly can
spill over completely into the •arket for low quality goods, This 
complete spillover has le1 1  offect on the equilibriwn that will obt a in 
than ' ' partial ' ' a pillover: a member of Ai c a n  spillover ' ' pa r tially' ' 
into the market for hiah quality 1ood1 if preci sely one of his or her 
ob1erv1 tion1 is t a ken a t  a firm which offer s the high quality good. 
Such 1 
•ember 
L •ember of Ai h 
of � •i•il arly 
effectively a non shopper in both marke t s, A 
can spill over partially into the m arke t for 
low qu1lity aoods if precisely one of hi• or her observ ations is taken 
a t  1 firm which offers the low quality aoo d .  P a r tial spillover is 
another term for the dilut ion in the effec tivene s s  of search that 
product heteroaeneity crea tes. ( see page 4 above) As an eumple, let 
A1 = 0 10 that all con1umer 1 are shopper s. Even in this ca se, a 
compe titive equilibri11111 may not ob tain for either good because, 
although everyone shops, some non shoppers will inevitably exi s t  in 
both marke t s, 
Par tial spillover or ' ' search dilution' ' also help s explain 
the na ture of the breaking con1traint 1, Equa tions ( 15) throuah ( 29) 
reveal two kinds of breaking constraint s, those which only include 
L II terms a s socia ted with non 1hopper1 ( a1,a1, or a1) on the left-hand
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s ide, and those which include additional terms a 1 1ocia ted with 
shopper s ( ai or •�) on t he left-hand side , The effec t s  of ch1n1e1 in 
con swner shopping pa t terns on t he likelihood that 1 compe titive 
equilibriwn w ill obt a in i1 sen sitive to which type of constr aint is  
actually binding ,  For uample, in ca se L3, if 
L L- L L-max{n3(�),n3(pL),n3(1L)) • n3(pL)' then equa tion ( 19)� 
L - -al + 2a2'iJ i FL/1(pL-cL)�i1 the operative con s t r aint, but if 
L L- L L max ln3(�),n3(pL),n3(1L)J • n3(1L), then equa tion ( 20)� 
•1 i FL/�( lL-cL)�i1 the oper ative constr aint. Whether a low quality
• 
firm is more or les s  likely to deviate from pL when con111111er shopping
pa tterns change in par ticular ways depend s crucially on which type of 
constraint is oper ative. 
Under1t1ndin1 more clearly 1 firm ' •  incentives to deviate from 
the competitive price requires 1 two step approach. First, we 
increase the propor tion of shoppers in such 1 way as t o  keep NL and N0 
con stant, This is called 1 ' ' balanced ' '  change in shoppers. Second, 
we hold the total propor tion of shopper s constant but shift consumer s 
between Ai and A� . This is called an ' ' unbalanced ' '  c hange in 
shopper s, 
5(a) Balanced Changes in Shopper s 
L II L Define K1 = a2 - a2. Suppose that a2 increases subject to two
L II condit ions: K1 remains con stant and neither a1 nor a1 rises (.i•.!• we
allow no absolute redi 1tr ibu t ion between A� and A: ) ,  Then from (8) 
and (9)  i t  i s  i .. ed i a te that � c [1/(a; - a�) J  - [ 18/ CsL - 18>J and
L H °n c ( 1L/( 1L - 18>1 - ll/a2 - a2>J, 10 t h a t
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Bence • • �'L + °n'B i 1  oon1tant w i th reapect t o  balanced change s i n
shopper s ,  Now cona i der the effec t s  o f  such change s o n  the likelihood 
that a compe t i t ive equ ilibr i1111 w ill obt a in when the operat ive 
oon 1tr1int 1 on both kinda of finis do not i nclude terms a 1 1oc i 1 ted 
w i th 1hopper 1 .  A balanced increaae in 1hopper 1 w ill never i ncrea se 
the left h and a ide of these con1t r a i nt 1 and w ill u sually lower i t  
s ince the increa se i n  a; and a� comes a t  the expen ae o f  ·� a n d  a�. 
Thi •  i•plie• tha t a decrea ae in the number of non 1hopper 1 make • a 
compe t i t ive equ ilibr i1111 more likely to occur in both m arke t s. The 
i nt u i t i o n  behi nd t h i 1 re1ult i s  clear: the oper a t ive constr a i n t s  fail 
L H to include a2 and a2 only when the pr ice that m a x i m izes prof i t •  for a 
dev iant f i rm nece 1 1arily elim ina tes all 1hopper1 from considera t i on , 
In such a c a 1e,  that product heterogene i ty can d i lute the 
effec t ivene s 1  of 1earch i 1  i rrelevant; the dev i ant firm sells o nly to 
non shoppers,  and when the i r  number is redu ced it can be come 
unprof i table for the firm to dev i ate . 
• 
A s  an example, con s i der case L3 , in which pL PL < lL < hL' 
and suppose a dev iant low qual ity firm to con s i der charg ing pL = lL' 
At th i s  pri ce, the firm would lose all shopper s whose other firm is 
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• • 
low qua l i ty becauae by a 1 11111pt i on that fil'll ch arge1 pL a nd pL < lL' 
I t  also would 10 1e any shopper s w ho ae other firm i a  h i gh qual i ty: 
•ember 1 of A!; prefer h i gh qua l i ty when i t  trsde 1  at i t 1  compe t i t ive 
price,  and member& of � sw i tch to h i gh quality in t h i 1  c i rcum 1 tance
s i nce lL) pL' Thu1 a low qua l i ty firm conte•pla t i ng a dev i a t i on from
• 
PL t o  lL w ill a a k  only whether the total percent a ge of non1hopper1 la
h i gh enough to  •ake the dev i a t ion profitable; this  f il'll would never 
1ell to a shopper . Since a balanced increa se i n  the number of 
shoppers leaves the d i s t r ibut ion of finis unchanged ( a nd thus the 
equ ilibr ium con aumer firm ra t i o ) , a decrea se in the percent a ge of 
nonshoppers w ill alway 1 m ake a dev i a t ion fr01:1 the compe t i t ive 
equilibr ium le 1 1  likely in t h i s  ca se .  Th i a  d i 1 cu 1 1 ion la lllllllllarized 
in the follow ing propo a i t i on: 
Propo s i tion !: Let the oper at ive con 1 t r a i n t 1  on both type s of f il'll be
L B i ndependent of a2 and a2, Then a balanced i ncrea 1e ( decrea ae ) in
L B 1hopper s wh ich does not i ncrea 1e (decrea se) e i ther a1 or a1 increa se s 
(decrea se s )  the l ikelihood that both marke t• are compe t i t ive. 
Next 1uppose the operat ive con1tra int 1 on both kinda of f il'll 
to i nclude a; or a� and i n i t i ally consider low qual i ty firms , Mo s t  
L H L constra i nts which include a2 or a2 take the fonn a1 + 2a2r;1 on the 
left-hand s i de (the excep t i on i s  (13 ) in ca se Ll) , The term 2a;°if i s
a s sociated w i th part i al spillovers; i t  only ari se s  when the price 
a s soci ated w i th the operat ive constraint is le s s  than or equal to the 
sw i tchprice for consumers who prefer low qual i ty (pL). When a dev iant 
low quality firm charges a price above the compe t i tive pr i ce but below 
L 
the 1w i t chpr ice , it r e t a i n •  thoae aembe r 1  of AZ who have parti ally 
spi l l e d  over i nto the a1rke t for h i gh quality. As long a 1  the pr i c e  
i t  charae • is l e 1 1  than o r  equal to min(lL, hL), i t  also r e t a i n •  all
aeabe r 1  of A1• The
L 
increase in 12 aakes i t  more likely that the firm
• 
w ill w i ah to dev i ate  from pL, b e c1u1e of the effe ct of par t i al 
1pi l lov e r 1 ,  but the de crease in a1 makes such a mot ivat ion le 11
l ike ly. I n  this case , the l a t t e r  effec t  dom ina tes because ai is
w e i ghted by � and balance d increases do not affe ct nL or nH' When
the price  that the dev iant low qua l ity firm charges i 1  greater than 
• 
ain(lL, hL), .<1·�· oa 1e L2, pL <PL ( hL < lL), the net effe ct is 
1mb i1uou1,  dependina on the extent  to which the decr ease in a 1 comes
L H a t  the exp e nse of a1 or 11• 
A s im ilar d i 1cu1 1 ion appl i es to po 1 1 ible dev i a t ions by high
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quality firms. If the pr i ce charged by 1 dev iant firm (1.�· the pr ice 
1 1 1oc i a t e d  w ith the ope rat ive constra int) i •  less than or equal to 
• i�!l 0, h0J, then a bal anced incr ease i n  shoppe rs makes it more  l ike l y
that 1 compe t i t iv e  e quilibri\1111 w il l  obt a i n. If t h e  pr ice i s  g r eater  
than m i n!10, h0J Ci.�· case Hl, Po= p0), then the ne t effe ct is a ga i n
ambi guous. l e  thus have t h e  follow ing proposi t i on. 
Proposit ion l: A 1 1uae that the ope rative constra ints on bo th types of
firm de pend on •i or·a�· 
profits for dev iant firms. 
Le t  p� and p� be the pr ices wh ich maxim ize
D Th e n  ( i ) pL i min(lL, hL) and
D Pe i min(ln, hnl iaply that a bal ance d incr ease (de crease) in shoppers
w i l l  make i t  more (less) l ikely that both marke ts a r e  compe t i t i ve,  and 
D D (2) PL > m in(lL,hL) ind Po > m in!l0,h0J imply that a balance d incr ease 
3 0  
in  1hoppe r 1  has ambi 1uou1 effe c t •  o n  t h e  l ikelihood o f  a compe ti tive 
equil ibr ium occurring. 
The implica t ion of Propo 1 i t i on1  1 and 2 is that bal anced 
incre a 1 e 1  in 1hoppe r 1  1ene r 1lly tend to aake it aor e l i ke l y  that both 
marke t •  a r e  compe t i t ive. The 1e cond step in  unde rst anding how changes 
in the mix of con 1ume r 1  affect the likelihood of 1 compe t i t i v e  
e quilibrium i n  bo th marke ts i •  to consider  qnbalanced changes in ai 
and a�--ch1nge 1 which do not ke ep ai - 1� constant.
5(b) Unbalanced Chanae1 ip Shoppers 
Unbalanced changes in •i and 1� induce changes in the m ix of
low and h i gh qua l ity f irms ( a nd thu1 in a). To b e g i n  to unde rsta nd 
the effect of these changes, 1uppo 1e that 'L > •e and consi de r an
incr ease in  •i that comes e nt i re l y  a t  the expe nse of a�; tha t i 1, •t 
H and 11 are held constant whi l e  some shoppers shift from the group.that
prefers h i gh quality to the group that prefers low qual i ty. De fine 
L H 12 = 12 + 12• I t  is shown i n  the appendix that
and 
These derivatives imply that 1 must decrease since we hav e  1 1sU111ed  
· that 'L > • n· 
The next step in the analysis i •  a a a i n  t o  div i de the br e��ing 
con 1tr1int1  into those that depe nd on and tho 1e that do not. 
The constra ints that do not de pe nd on are mor e likely to be 
11 t i 1f ied�1.�. dev iat ion • from the compe t i t ive pr ice a r e  l e 1 1  
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l ikel y--when the increase i n  a� i• unbalanced, To see why this is so, 
recall that such a shift both increases the proportion of shoppers who 
are predisposed to buy low quali ty and decreases the number of low 
quali ty fi rms. Unle 1 1  more of the shoppers who prefer low quality 
spill over totally into the market for high qual ity, excess demand 
w ill occur in the l ow qua l i ty marke t .  To avo i d  t h is disequilib r i um  
phenomenon - i . �.to fac ilitate total spillovers - the number of h i gh 
quality firms must increase. When high quality firms are assumed to 
have lower capac i ty, the equ ilibr iwa consumer firm ratio thus must 
also decl ine .  Such a decl ine makes dev iations from competi tive pr ices 
le1 1  prof i table for firms that would depend only on the bus iness of 
non 1hopper 1 after the pr i ce r ise. Thia i 1  because, w ith a lowered 
consumer firm rat io,  ea ch f i rm  has fewer expected cust omers, including 
fewer non1hopper 1, and 10 is less equipped t o  w i thstand 1011 of 
patrona ge, This leads t o  Proposition 3: 
Proposition l: Suppose that 'L > 18 and that the operative
constraints on both type of f i i d d f L d ff 1 rm are n epen ent o a2 an a2• 
L H an unbalanced increase in a2 (a2) will increase (decrease) the 
likelihood that both markets are competitive, 
The final step in  our formal analys is is to consider 
Then 
unbalanced ch anaes in shoppers when the operative constrai nts on both 
types of firm do depend on a� or a� . It is shown in the append ix 
that: 
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and 
These derivatives impl y  that a n  unbalanced increase in a� w ill make i t
.l!.!! likely that the market for low quality goods i s  competi t ive and 
more l ikely that the marke t  for high qual ity goods is compe t i t ive, 
This is a somewhat star tling result: An increase in the number of 
shoppers who prefer the l ow quality good which comes ent i rely at the 
expense of shoppers who prefer the hi ah qua l ity aood m a k.e 1 i t  J.ll.! 
likely that f irms offer i ng the low qua l ity aood w ill find i t  
unprof itable t o  i ncrease pr i ces above the competi t ive pr i ce but makes 
i t  more l ikely that firms offer ing the h i ah qua l i ty 1ood w ill find it 
unprof ita ble to i ncrease p r i ces above the compe titive pri ce, 
To see why this result obtains, observe that the operat ive 
constraint for l ow quali t y  dev iants depends on a� if and only if the
price that maxim izes profits for the dev iant f i rm  is less than or 
equal to the sw i tchpr ice PL' Similarly, the operative constra i nt for 
h i gh quality dev iants depends on a� if and only if the pr ice that
max im izes prof its for the dev iant firm is less than or equal to the 
switchpr ice Pu· In these cases, parti al spillover matters. 
Furthermore, while a shift from a� to a� increases the number of 
comparison shoppers who prefer the low quality good, it also i ncreases 
the number of these consumers who w ill take only one observat ion in 
the market for low quality goods because some members of Ai will 
part ially spillover into the market for high quality goods. A firm 
• 
offerln1 t he low quali ty 1ood tha t w i 1he 1 to dev i a te from PL knows
tha t it  w ill lose all c ompari son shopper s but  get  all nonahopp er s ,  
Because o f  par t ial spillover, the number of non 1hopper 1 i n  t he low 
quality market a c t ually increa 1e 1 w hen a� incre a s e s  ent irely at the 
expense of a�. Thus , a firm offeri n1 t he low qual i ty good i a  more 
• 
l ikely to dev i a ta from pL , In the market for high quali ty goo d s ,  aa 
a� decrea s e s ,  the number of 1hopper1 who w ill ta ke only one
obs ervat i on in the market for high quali ty goods decl ine s. So doe s 
t he number of shoppers in thi s market who prefer hi gh qua l i ty goods 
a nd t a ke bo t h  observ at i on s  in i t ,  But from the po int of v i ew of a 
firm offer i ng the h i gh quali ty good, fewer non1hopper1 ex i s t a s  a 
n 
result of the de cl i ne in a2 , Thus , thi s firm w ill find i t  le s s
• 
prof i table to dev i a te frocn Pn and w ill be le11 l ikely to do so , The 
L tt re sult i a  t ha t  w hen a2 incre a se s  ent irely at the expense of a2, a 
compe t i t iv e  equilibrium in the marke t for low quali ty goo ds i s  le ss 
l ikely to  occur while a compet i t iv e  equilibrium in the m arke t for high 
quality 1oo d1 i s  more likely to  occur, 
As  w i th the c a se in whi ch the opera t iv e  constra i nt s do not 
de pend on a� or a� , there are a g a i n  indirect e ffec t s  a ss o c i a t e d  w i th 
unbalanced change s i n  a� and a�. These indirect e ffe c t s are
L II a ss o c i a t e d  w i th ''rebalanci ng'' the market when a2- 12 change s. When
'L > •n and a� + a� h constant , i t  turns out tha t 
As be fore , the s i gn s  of the se deri v at iv e s  are explained by the nee d to  
kee p sp illovers be tween the market s  balanced w i th the capa c i ty 
constraint s ,  and w ork t o  reinforce the d i rect effec t •  of a shift from 
B L a2 t o  a2• An increa se  in 8u and a decrea se i n  nL makes i t  more l i kely 
that a member of � w ill parti ally spillover into t he market for the
h igh qual i ty good because more h igh qua l i ty f i rm •  then exi st ,  Also, 
thi s sh ift  make s  it le11 l ikely that  a member of e i ther � or � w ill
act  a s  a compari son shopper i n  the marke t for the low quali ty good , 
Similarly, an 
that  a member 
increase in 8u a nd a 
u of A2 w ill part i ally 
decrea se in nL makes i t  le 1 1  l ikely 
spillover into t he marke t for the 
low quality good,  and more l i kely tha t a member of e i ther � or � 
w ill a c t  a s  a compari son shopper in the market for the h igh qua l i ty 
good, 
The se d irec t  a nd indi rec t affec t s  lead to a f inal propo s i t i on.  
Propo sition !: Suppo se that 'L > 18 and that  the operat ive
constra int s on bo th type s of firm depend on a� or a� . Then a n
unbalanced increa se (decre a se )  in a� w ill decrea se ( increa se) the
l ikel ihood that the marke t for low quali ty 1ood1 is  compe t i t iv e  a nd 
w ill incre a se (decre a se ) the l ikel ihood that  the market for h iah 
qua l i ty goods i s  compe t i t ive,  
6 .  Pol icy Implications and Limitations of the Analy1i1 
To beat perceive  the pol icy implica t ions of the analy 1 i 1  made 
abov e, consider first a marke t for a homo1eneou 1 search good , We have 
prev iously 1hown9 that a compe t i t ive equil ibri um  w ill obt a in in  such a 
marke t if and o nly if Az !<A1 + Az >l 1-[ F /a(pL-p )), where F i s a fixed
co 1 t ,  pL i1 t h e  common liait price of all con1umers and p i s  the
oon1tant  a arainal cost.  Thi• model is helpful to  de cisiol!Slake rs  in 
two ways. Fis t ,  it sugge s t s  aethods of recognizing whether marke t s  
are in compe titive equilibrium or not ,  t h e  principal criteria having 
to do with the e1tent of compari1on shopping a nd t h e  degre e t o  which 
price s  clu 1 t er. Second, it implie s t h a t  the be st way to move badly 
behaving marke t s  t oward compe titive equilibria is t o  increa se 
comparison shopping ( incre a s e  "zl<A1 + Az>> by redu cing the cost s of 
comparing purchase al terna t ive 1 ,  Dow are the 1e sugge stions a ffec t e d  
by the e1i s t ence of product  h e te roge neity? 
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I nitially, because heterogeneous 1ood1 marke t s  seems likely t o
segment int o homo1e neou1 1ub1e t 1 ,  deci1ionmaker1 c a n  very much 
1iaplify the ta sk of deciding when an intervention in a marke t on 
informa tion ground s  i• nece 1 1ary by a 1 1uming t h a t apparently dis t inct 
product • a c tually do trade in separa te aarke t 1, A1 an exampl e ,  a 
d e ci 1io11111aker deciding w h e ther informa tion problem s make a marke t for 
stereo equipment noncompe t itive could 1 uppo1e , a s  a working 
a s sumption, t h a t  the m arke t s  for ''high end'' and ''low end'' 
equipment do not interact; he or 1he could t hu s  t re a t  e a ch marke t a s  
de aling with roughly h01101eneou1 aoods , and evalua te the marke t s' 
ooape titive 1 t a t e 1 with the aid of our earlier model. This is not t o  
1 a y  t h a t  int erac t ion• be tween marke t s  will never occur or tha t goods 
in marke t s  such as that for low end s t ereo equipment are truly 
homoge neous. I t  i• only to 11y t h a t  some formal support e1i 1 t s  t o  
believe t h a t  a decisionmaker would seldom g o  seriously wrong if h e  or 
1he adop t e d  a pre sumption o f  segmenta tion when segmenta tion 1eemed 
intuitively plausible , The 11ving 1 in a dminis tra tive co1t 1 from 10 
a c t ing perhaps  could outweigh the errors that thi1  presumption would 
cause . 1 0
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If marke t s  for good s of different qualitie s do interact a nd 
are badly beh aved for information rea 1on 11 the principal policy 
pre scription of our e arlier aodel--increa 1ina the nU11ber of comparison 
1hoppers--al10 remain • plauaible. 1 1  I nitially, 1upp o 1e t h a t  one or
both of the marke t •  i• in equilibrium at the aonopoly price ( ae nerally 
� or IL ) .  In this c a s e ,  firm s tha t lower their price s  would g e t  all 
shoppers who visit them; incre a sing t h e  nt1111ber of shoppers thu1  aake • 
monopoly equilibria le as  likely. Al10, driving price s below t h e  
monopoly price probably would increa se welfare. This i s  becau se  firm • 
in the model de s cribed here earn zero e1p e c t e d  profit• in all 
equilibria and so would be indifferent t o  the equilibrium t h a t  
a c t ually obt a ine d ,  while con1W11ers would bene fit e1 a n t e  from the 
lower pric e s ,  Suppose in s t e a d  t h a t  a marke t is  in equilibrium a t  a 
price be twe e n  the compe titive a nd monopoly price s. B e c a u s e  a n  
increa s e  i n  the number o f  shopper s  c a n  be de compo se d int o  ''balanced'' 
and ''unbalance d'' incre a 1 e 1  and because  1ome unbalanc e d  incre1 se 1 can 
decre a s e  the likelihood of compe titive equilibria obt aining in one of 
the marke t s  ( 1e e  Propo sition 4), an intervention t o  reduce the co st • 
of comparison shopping in this ''intermedia te'' c a se could h ave 
unde sirable effe c t s ,  Further, it would be difficult for 
de cisionmaker1 to predic t th e se effect s in advance . 
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Bven in t hi1 interaedia te case,  however, a 1 t r a teay of 
increa 1 l n1 the amount of comparison 1hoppin1 is probably wi1e , This 
i 1  becau1e increa 1in1 the amount of compa rison shopping is l ikel y al so 
t o  increa 1e the inten1ity of  search, a nd the abil ity of product 
heteroaeneity t o  dil ut e  the ef fec tiv ene1 1  of search v a rie s inver sel y 
with the amount of 1earch that occur s .  A1 an example,  in the form a l  
model above 1hoppe r 1  vi1ited preci1ely two firm s ;  it w a s  thus 
rel a tively ea 1y for them t o  vi1it one f il'lll in each aarket a nd so  
effect ively t o  be non1hopper 1 ,  I f  the1e shopper s '  1 1mpl e size were t o  
increa se, they wou l d  b e  l e 1 1  l ikel y t o  aet ' ' s tuck' ' •  and t he 
unde sirable effec t s of inore1 1in1 the n1111ber of shopper • in the 
intel'Jlediate c a se •iaht not occur . Another way t o  put t his  is that  
1e1men t a tion i• more l ikel y when 1earch intensity increa ses because, 
for exampl e ,  1hoppe r 1  who prefer l ow qua l it y  may t a ke enough 
ob1erva tion1 in the low qua l ity marke t to be compa ri1on shoppers in it  
de spite any hiah qua l ity ob1erva tion1 they may a l so hav e made. Given 
t h a t  the unde1irable effect • of an intervention appa r ent l y  woul d 
obt ain in a minority of intermedia te o a se s  even with the smsl le s t  
shopping 1 1apl e 1ize po 1 sibl e  ( 1ee Propo sitions 1 -3 ) , a n d  that  
redu cina the 00 1 t 1 of  compari1on 1hopping a c t ua l l y  coul d increa se 
sampl e 1ize 1 ,  the model developed here 1ugge 1 t s that  a decisionmaker 
1houl d a lways seriou s l y  consider reducing the cost s of compa rison 
1hoppin1 when a market i s  badly behaved for information rea 1ons. 
Recent evidence a l 10 is consi1tent with the view that this 
1 t r a te1y can r educe prices in heterogeneous goods marke t s .  Devine a nd 
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Marion provided con11111er s with 1oae compara tive price infontation and 
with a weighted index of  prices on sixty- f iv e  00111mon food ite•• for 
supermarke t •  in a Canadian city for a five week perio d ,  A weiahted 
index of  1uperaarket prioe1 ii  a nal ogou1 to a 1in1le p rice for a 
heterogeneou1 1ood , Prices in the 11mp l e  marke t  decl ined 
1ub 1 t1ntial l y  and p rice disper sion decrea 1ed durina t he experiment a l  
period, whil e prices a nd disper 1ion were l a rael y  unaf fec t ed in the 
cont rol marke t . 1 2 • A l 10,  1earch inten sit y  apparent l y  incre1 1ed , In
a ddition, the Devine and Ma rion 1 tudy ten t a tivel y 1u11e 1ted that the 
g ain in con11111er 1urpl u1  f rOll the1e price decl ine• exceeded the 11111 of 
the proar1111 ' 1  ad.mini 1 t r a tive co st s and the dec l ine in producer • 
1urpl u1.  Thu1 reducin1 the c o 1 t 1 of compa rison 1hoppin1 in b a d l y  
behaved consumer marke t •  i1  a potentia l l y  useful pol icy option, 
A 1eriou1 difficul ty for a deci1io1111aker when aarke t 1  for 
different qual ity 1ood1 do in fact inter a c t ,  however, i1 how to know 
when these marke t •  are badly behaved . The earl ier h01101eneou1 search 
goods model w a 1  1uf ficien t l y  t r a c t able for u 1  t o  be a b l e  to  
char act erize a l l  p o 1 1ibl e  equil ibria from c ompetitive t o  monopol y ,  We 
thus coul d develop criteria t h a t  wou l d  aid in identifying the kind of 
equil ibri1111 that  a c t ua l l y  obt ained in a market.  Becau1e thi1 paper 
onl y charac terize• co�petitive equilibria, we h ave l it t l e  to say to • 
decisionmaker who want s t o  know, when marke t •  do inter act , whether 
problem• exis t  or not . Our future work wil l a ttempt f orma l l y  t o  
characterize noncompetitive equilibria in heterogeneous 1ood1 aarke t 1 ,  
The 1na l y 1is made above i s  l im i ted a 1  1 1ource o f  advice t o  
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dec i l i onmakers for n o  ot her rea son s .  Ini t i a l ly,  we a u ame tha t 
oon11111er 1 are aware of qua l i ty d ifferenc e s  before they beg in t o  
search. Shopp ing ,  hCJWever, 1omet ime 1  perform s an edu c a t ive fun c t ion ,  
i n  which per sons  l earn about 111rket opt i on s a s  they g o  a l ong. Ma rke t s 
of thi s kind mi1ht be less  wel l behaved than the market s de scribed 
above s i nce search i s  more l ikel y  to  i nv o l ve wa sted effort , but in the 
absence of form a l  ana l y a i s  i t  i s  d i fficu l t  to know. Further, we dea l t  
w i th a hetero1eneou1 search 1ood ,  but many goo ds , includ i ng some us ed 
in our intui t ive expl anat ion s ,  h ave illporta nt experience a spec t s. 
Whether our conc l u s i ons  are a pp l icab l e  in these ca ses a g a in i a  a very 
open que s t i on ,  whi ch we sha l l  a ddre s s  el sewhere ,  
7 . Cone l u  iop 
)!a rke t a  tha t are 1 1 id to behave ba d l y  becaus e  c on sl1l!ler s are 
imperfec t l y  informed have been s i gn i f i c a nt obj ect s of pub l ic c oncern 
for over 1 decade , Our ear l i er paper s dea l ing w i th homqieneous search 
1ood1 1u gge s ted that  thi s concern may be exa ggera ted,  Th i s  i s  because 
the pri ncipal  fac tor caus ing m arke t s  to  behave compet i t ivel y is  the 
extent of compari son shopp i ng ,  and it a pparent l y  t a ke s  less compa r i son 
1hoppi ng to generate c ompet i t iv e  out comes than had prev ious l y  been 
supposed. The present pa per, dea l ing w i th marke t s  for heterogeneous 
1earch goods,  rea che1 conclu1 i on s  l arge l y  c on s i stent w i th our earl ier 
work, for i t  show s  t ha t  marke t s  for heterogeneous search good s  ten d 
ra ther ea s i l y  to segment into roughly homogeneous subset s ,  When 
heterogeneous goods market s do i�tera c t , however, product
heterogene i ty can work 1g1 i na t  the ex i stence of  compet i t ive equi l ib r i a  
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equ i l ibr i a  because i t  d i l ut e s  t h e  effect ivenes s  of 1earch. Increa 1 in1 
t he extent of co11pari 1on shopping in  t hese marke t s  neverthel e s s  
rem a i n s  a sen s i b l e  remedy; they t o o  are more l ikel y  to  rea ch 
compe t i t ive equ i l ibr i a  i f  more d i rect co11p1ri 1on shopp ing oc curs in 
them. Recogn i z ing when marke t s  that  i ntera c t  a c t ua l ly are behav ing 
badly,  however, i• a d i fficul t probl em ,  re1pec t in1 which the model 
des cribed above h a s  l i t t l e  to  11y. A l so,  any reco ... end1t ion1 we do 
make to  dec i 1 ionmaker1 must be important l y  qua l if ied by the 
l im i ta t ions  of th i s  model , in  par t i c u l a r  i t s  a 1 1umpt ion1  t h a t  
con 1umer1 are ful l y  aware o f  qua l i t y  d ifferences before they be1 in t o  
search and 1hop o n l y  for search 1ood1. Further work w i l l a ttemp t t o  
general ize t h e  research described here, 
APPBNDIX 
illJJI 1 (p. 1 5 ) : 
� Expected deaand equal to capacity for f l.rm• of each quality 
type yleld1 (1ee p. 1 5 )
and 
Rearran1ln1 each of the1e and eliminating (A1/N) yields 
A number of tedious operations reduces thi• equation substantially: 
'Lt\,NiJ - Ai�ll  - (NiJ/N)2] - ��(NL/N) 2 
• • eNLNiJ - �t\,ll  - (�/N)21 - °'2,(Nu/N) 2
41 
or, finally, 
L H N ( 1L - 18) • "i - "i 
Equation (Al ) can be used to find NL and NL. To do this note that 
Solvin1 (Al) and ( A2 )  for NL and 1ettin1 the results equal to each 
other yields:  
Bence 
and, finally, 
42 
(Al) 
( A2 )  
Thus 
Ill.ill a. ( p .  2 9) : 
u--- ' ·  L B � By de f in i t ion, 12 • a2 + a2 , and 
°L • NL/N 
• [A( aL - 'B) - 'B<.{ - �) J / ( •L - •e> 2 (� - �) / ( aL - •u> 
• ( A( IL - 'B) - •u< .{ - �) J / ( aL - Sg> <.{ - �)
Thua 
A ai•i l ar c a l cul a t ion ahow a  ( 8°e/ a ai> l 1 > O. 2 
43 .... 
Q . E . D, 
.£1.tlm l ( p .  3 0) : 
and 
Q , E . D. 
From Cl • i• 2 we hive 
Thu s 
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Simi l a r  ted i ous  c a l cu l a t i ons  e st ab l i sh the r em a i nder o f  the c l a i m ,  
Q . E . D .  
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Greene , John Fe rej ohn and James S t r nad made h e l pful co11111 ent s on pri or 
dra f t s .  The pa per a l so be ne f i te d  f rom a conver sat ion w i th Mi chael  
Rot hch i l d  a nd pre sent a t i on a t  the  UCLA Law and Econom i c s  work shop ,  
1 .  See W i l de and Schwartz  ( 1 97 9 ) ; Schwar t z  and U i l de ( 1979) . 
2. Th e se cr i te r i a  included the extent to which price s clus te r in a 
marke t ,  the extent of compari son shopp i ng ta king p l ace there , t he 
r e l a t iv e  ea se  w i th whi ch consum er s can compare purcha se 
a l ternat ive • d i r e c t l y  and t he re l a t iv e  d i f f i cul ty that f i rm s  
woul d have i n  d i scr im i nat ing among c on sum er s on the ba se s of  
know l edge or soph i s t ic a t ion , See Schwartz  and W i l de ( 1 97 9 ) , 
3 .  Recent search equ i l ibr ium mode l s  have sought i n  i nt e r e s t i ng 
f a sh i on to char a c t e r i z e  equi l ibr i a  in env ironm ent • where sea rch 
co s t s  are  po s i t ive  for some f ra c t i on of consumer s ,  See Salop  a nd 
St i g l i tz ( 1 977 ) , Varian  ( 1 980 ) , Dagno l i  ( 1980) . The mode l 
de scr ibed  be l ow d i f fer s f rom t h e se paper s in two important w ay s ; 
i t  a ss um e s  t ha t  sea rch co s t s  are po s i t ive  for a l l  consumer s and 
it dea l s  w i th he t e r oge neous good s ,  
4 .  We have exp l a i ne d  e l 1ewhere why con1umer 1 m ight use f ixed 11mpl e
1 i z e  1tr1te 1 i e 1 . See W ilde and Schwartz ( 1 979) ; Schwartz and 
W il de ( 1 97 9 ) . In b r i e f ,  a f ixed 11mple  1 i z e  1tr1te1y ••Y be 
opt imal when con1umer 1 have very iaprec i 1e inform a t i on r e 1pect in1 
the pr ice 1 and qu1 l i t i e 1  they are l ikely to  1 e e ,  bec1u1e 
con11111er1  1eea to make fewer a i 1t 1ke 1-- 1e 1 rch in1 ne i ther too much 
nor too l i t t l e--when u 1 i n1 t h i •  1 t r 1 te 1y than when u 1 i n1 
sequent i a l  se arch 1tr1te1 i e 1 .  
5 .  The Introduc t i on a raue d that the 1e cond i t i on •  a r e  qui te 1tron 1  but 
we do not want to ov er1t1te  the po i nt . If consumer preferenc e •  
f or q•• l i ty are heter o1ene ou1, then 1ome con111111er1  m iaht e x i 1 t  a t  
the t a i l  o f  the d i 1t r ibu t i on of tho 1e who prefer l ow qua l i ty who 
woul d purcha se h iah qua l i ty if they 11w only i t ,  and 1 im i l 1rly 
for the d i st r ibut i on of those who prefer h iah qua l i ty .  The 
iapo r t1nce of inch ' ' 1p i l l over 1 ' ' i 1  an emp i ri c a l  que 1 t i on .  
6 .  I n  a wor l d  o f  perfect informa t ion, our formal 1 1 1umpt ion1 woul d 
prec lude the e x i 1 t ence of a compe t i tive equ i l ibr i um ,  To 1ee why , 
ob serve how the capa c i ty con1tr1 i n t  ( 1 )  a c tua l ly look• : 
\I � C\. ......... ' '".., 
Suppo1e that a l l  fi rm• ch1r1ed the compe t i tive pr ice and one f irm 
then r 1 i 1ed i t 1  price , Bec1u1e al l f irm• in the marke t a r e  at 
capac i ty,  no  f i rm could expand output to  1upply the cu1tomer1 of 
the dev iant f ini .  A l 1 0 ,  s ince there i1 a po 1 i t iv e  co 1t to  e ntry , 
a r1n1e of price r i 1e 1  e x i 1t 1 for th i s  f il'll such th1t no e ntry 
would occur . Thu1 the compe t i tive pr ice could not be an 
e qu i l ib r i um .  Th i 1  obj e c t i on i1 not compe l l in1 in the framework 
of our model for two r e 1 1o n 1 .  F i r 1t , if the r iaht-hand 
de r iv a t ive of th e aver age co1t curve at 1 were f in i te ,  e x i 1t in 1  
f i rm• could e xpand output a nd make the dev i a t i on unprof i tabl e ,  
The u1e of  a capa c i ty oon 1 t r 1 i nt in  our aode l i 1  n o  aore than a 
convenient way to avoid the oomplex i t i e 1  of u1in1  U-1h1ped 
averaae coat  curve s ,  but it i1 real i st ic to 1uppo 1e tha t  f il'll• '  
aver aae co1t curv e •  wil l have a po 1 i t iv e  s l ope a t  the prof i t  
m1ximiz in1 l evel of output . Thu1 a compe ti tive equil ibr ium oould 
e x i 1 t  in real wor l d  0 1 1e 1 ,  Second, con1u.er 1 i n  our mode l 1hop 
1toch11t io1 l ly and take r a i n  check• f rom f i1"11  w ho 1e price i •  
acceptab l e  but who are stocked out i n  the 1hoppi n1 per i od .  Thu1 
consum e r •  woul d not buy from the dev iant f ini in the short r un ,  
a n d  th i 1  e l iain1 t e 1  t h e  incent ive of t h e  f ira t o  dev ia t e  f r oa  the 
compe t i t ive pri ce .  
7 .  The proof of th i 1  c l aia fol l ows frOll 1r1um ent 1 which are now 
1t1nd1rd , See Le .. 1 2 of W i l de and Schw a r tz ( 1 97 9) , 
8 .  The text 1 1 1ume 1 11mpl in1 w ith repl acement whe r e 1 1  i t  i 1  more 
re1l i 1t i c  to 1 11ume 1aapl in1 w i thout r ep l acemen t . Th i s  i 1  
because a member o f  �· for exampl e ,  who v i 1 i t 1  one l ow  qua l ity 
f i rm  w i l l choo1e a second f i rm  to v i 1 i t  from a d i 1t r ibut i on that 
doe • not inc l ude the f int al ready v i s i ted , When the number of  
f i111  in  a • a rket i•  l ar1e , however,  the  d i f ference b e tween 
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1 .. pl in1 w i th and w i thout r epl acement v ani 1he 1 ,  le 1uppo 1e the 
nuaber of f i 111  to be 1 1r1e and a 1 1ume 1a•pl in1 w i th repl acement 
because t h i 1  1 impl i f i e 1  cal cul a t i on. Th ia  i• the st andard 
approach used in the se arch l i t e r a ture , 
9 .  See W il de and Schwartx ( 197 9) , 
1 0 .  The propens i ty of he tero1ene ou1 goods ••rke t 1  to 1e 1ment i 1  
r e l ev ant t o  a v a r i e ty o f  l e1 1 l  i 1 1ue 1 ,  Aa an e xampl e ,  1uppo 1e 
that a de c i 1 i onm1ker want • to know , for purpo 1e 1 of eva l ua t ing 
the l e 1al i ty of a hor i x ont a l  ••r 1 e r ,  whe ther two phy s i ca l ly 
1 i• i l a r  but not ident ical  1ood1 that tr ade at d i f fer ent pr i c e s  
a re in  t h e  1a•e •arke t ,  The ma rke t s  f or t h e s e  good• m a y  interact 
in such f a sh ion that,  for exampl e ,  both 1ood1 a re t r ad ing at 
the i r  co•pe t i tive price s ,  the pr ice d i st inct ion be ing 
a t tr ibut able  to  d i f ferent produc t i on funct i ons and consumer 
prefer ence s ,  Al terna t ively,  no interact i on be tween the two 
•arke t 1  i •  occurrin1,  The an1 l y 1 i 1  above sugge s t s  that where
pr ice d i st inc t i on•  be tween rou1hly s i m i l a r  goods pe r s i s t ,  the 
l a t ter s i tua t i on i 1  the •ore l ike l y .  
1 1 . l e  1u1 1e1t th at the state should inc r e a se the number of 
compa r i son shoppe r s  by reduc ing  the co s t s  to consumers of 
d i re c t ly compa r i na purcha se a l terna t ive s .  For exampl e ,  
compa r a t ive pr i ce information could be made w ide ly av ai l abl e .  
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Such a pol icy pr escr ipt i on i•  to  be d i 1t in1u i 1hed f rOll propo 1a l 1  
that would prov ide con1umer 1 w i th ' ' inst i tut i ona l know led1e ' '  of 
the sor t :  ' 'Only f i rm s  A ,  B and C 1 e l l  hi1h qua l i ty ' ' •  Prov id in1 
con1umer 1 w i th inst i tu t i ona l knowl ed1e al one would be unw ise 
because some con1umer 1 could 1et  tr apped in  the wron1 •arke t ,  To 
se e how, 1uppo1e that a consumer w i th such know l ed1e perce ive s  
h imse l f  t o  prefer hi1h qua l i ty before h e  be1 in1 to  shop and thus 
pl ans to sampl e  only hi1h qua l i ty f i 111 ,  Th i •  consumer could e nd 
up psy ing h i •  l i• i t  pr ice for a h i1h qua l i ty item whe r e a s ,  if he 
shopped random l y ,  he • ight have aeen a l ow qua l i ty 1ood se l l ing 
a t  i t •  compe t i tive pr ice , which in many c 1 1 e 1  would be preferred 
to  buyin1 a h i1h qua l ity 1ood a t  the l im i t  pr ice , Prov id in1 
con1umer 1 w i th in1t i tut i on1l knowl ed1e •• w e l l  •• r educ in1 the 
co1t 1 to  them of d i rectly comp1 r in1 purchase al terna t iv e •  m i1ht 
be w i s e ,  but prov id in1 inat i tut i onal know l ed1e al one in a wor l d  
o f  hetero1ene ou1 1ood1 would not be , 
1 2 .  See Devine and Ma r i on ( 1 97 9 ) , Other emp i r i c a l  stud i e s  a l so report 
price decl ine s fol l ow ing induced reduc t i ons in the coat to  
con1umer 1 of  d i rectly compa r ina purchase 1 l tern1 t ive 1 ,  See · 
McNe i l •  Nev in, Trubeck and Mi l ler ( 197 9)  ( used c 1 r 1 ) ;  Rus so,  
Ir e i ser  and M iyash ita ( 1 97 5 )  ( d i 1hw a 1h in1 l iquid, ca nned dog  
food, facial  t i s sue s ) . 
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